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(Oral Argument
Priority No. 4)

I.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
ARGUMENT I.
I.

THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN DENYING MRS.

AHLUWALIA'S

REQUEST

FOR

CUSTODY,

POSSESSION

OF

THE

MARITAL

RESIDENCE AND IN CONSEQUENTLY ORDERING CHILD SUPPORT.

Two

areas

of

evidence

that

were

crucial

to

the

appropriate decision on the custody issue were completely ignored
by the Trial Court.
A.

The Trial Court clearly and wrongly ignored the

requirement of Roendahl v. Roendahl 240 Utah Adv. Rpt. 25 (Utah
App. 1994) which referenced at page 26, Utah Code Annotated §30-310 regarding the fact that a Trial Court must consider, among other
factors, which parent is most likely to allow the child frequent
and continued contact with the non-custodial parent.

The Trial

Court is required to consider this element regarding custody.

No

finding on the record below exists to show that the Trial Court
considered this issue.
The evidence at trial was clear that Mr. Ahluwalia made
obvious and blatant attempts to interfere with Mrs. Ahluwalia's
visitation relationship with her children by asserting that the
Plaintiff should be out looking for a job rather than being with
her child.

(Tr. at R. 207, 209, 252-253).
2

As cited in her

Appellant's brief, the case of Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407 (Utah
App. 1990) states at page 411 that the custodial parent has a duty
to foster the child's relationship with the non-custodial parent.
The evidence at trial was undisputed that Mrs. Ahluwalia
had been the primary care taker and care provider for the minor
children.

(Tr. at R. 182-183)

The evidence was undisputed that

Mrs. Ahluwalia had caused the children to develop into good, well
adjusted children, (Tr. at R. 182-183), and that she. had made the.
hard decision to remove stress in their lives by separating herself
from Mr. Ahluwalia.

(Tr. at R. 209-210). Mrs. Ahluwalia obviously

knew how to foster children in their growth and relationships.
In the testimony of Elizabeth Hickey, she could not
testify that Mr. Ahluwalia would foster the relationship of the
children with their mother, while she could testify that their
mother would do so.

(Tr. at R. 185-187).

The evidence at trial

was undisputed that Mr. Ahluwalia failed to foster the parent/child
relationship when he had the chance to do so.

(Tr. at R. 207-209,

252-253). The Trial Court ignored this most critical issue, and as
a result the decision on the issue is clearly erroneous and must be
reversed.
B.

The Court below really wanted to leave the children

in the family home, and to leave them together. Those were the two
keys to the decision. The custody evaluator indicated that stress
in the family was relieved once there was a separation of the
parties and had Mr. Ahluwalia rather than Mrs. Ahluwalia left the
home, the same result in terms of relieving stress in the family
3

would have likely occurred (Tr. at R. 183-184),

In other words, a

principal reason the children had flourished in the care of their
father is because stress was removed from the family and the
children would have

flourished whether

the mother

or father

remained as the custodial parent*
Consequently, to decide that at a later time the children
were better off than they were at the time of separation, credit
must be given to the primary cause of that positive result.

In

this instance the primary cause of the positive result was the wise
yet extremely painful decision of a mother that would rather remove
herself away from her children, leaving them where they would be
physically

safe,

in

order

condition of the home.

to

eliminate

a

serious

emotional

According to the wisdom of King Solomon,

such a mother truly would be the one with the children's best
interests at heart.
While it is true that the case law generally holds that
the facts at the time of trial are the facts upon which the custody
decision should be based, this particular circumstance presents a
compelling counter-argument to that general rule.

The Plaintiff

testified that she moved out of the home because her presence in
the home was creating so much stress in the family, she believed
that it was in the children's best interest to relieve that stress
(Tr. at R. 209-210).

That is exactly the situation that occurred.

To fail as the Court below did, to give Mrs. Ahluwalia credit for
her perception and sacrifice, when she clearly did not simply
abandon the family, but created a situation where there could be
4

healing and things could and did get better, was clear error by the
Trial Court and must be reversed.
ARGUMENT II.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN DENYING MRS.

AHLUWALIA'S REQUEST FOR ALIMONY.
The Trial Court and Mr. Ahluwalia both concluded that
Mrs.

Ahluwalia

had

not

made

what

they

considered

to

be a

"reasonable effort" to support herself since separation. Where in
all the

literature

of

divorces

in the

State of Utah

is a

requirement found that a woman who has been at home, as a mother
and primary care-taker of minor children, in order to justify her
request for alimony, must show that she has made a "reasonable
attempt" to support herself since separation?

That requirement

cannot be found in the law of the State of Utah.

Yet, it was the

primary element of the Court's conclusion regarding the alimony
issue.
There is law in our State that the Trial Court must make
specific findings regarding the needs of both the payor and payee
as well as the ability of each to earn income and make specific
findings regarding both those issues prior to making an award of
alimony. See Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684 (Utah App. 1990). The
decision regarding the payee's ability to support his or her self
must

be

made

independent

distribution of the parties.

of

any

analysis

of

the

property

See Roberts v. Roberts, 835 P.2d 193

(Utah App. 1992) .
It is a totally different finding to determine the
5

ability of a party to earn income versus a decision about what that
party

has

done

by way

of

effort

to

earn

income

since the

separation.
The Trial Court, in a mean-spirited attack on a long term
stay-at-home mother, ignored the undisputed evidence at trial that
Mrs. Ahluwalia left a "tenured" teaching position in Florida to
follow and support the career of her husband to Pennsylvania and
thereafter Utah.

(Tr. at R. 177-179, 147-152, 157).

There is

nowhere in the literature of divorce law in the State of Utah a
reguirement that at every step along the way the spouse now
reguesting alimony must have made "reasonable efforts" in each of
those circumstances to obtain employment.
Contrary to the Trial Court's view of the law, if Mrs.
Ahluwalia had made absolutely no effort to gain employment at any
time prior to the trial, the Court would still have the same
decision to make.

That decision would have been as cited in the

cases above, i.e. what is Mrs. Ahluwalia's ability to earn a
living?

Regarding a 17 year marriage, to consider only what

temporary earnings, or earnings less than those available in the
field of a party's training and experience would provide, and to.
attach too much importance to such earnings, is clear error on the
part of the Trial Court.
Mrs. Ahluwalia testified that she had applied at all the
local school districts for employment but had not been able to
obtain full time employment at the time of trial.

Mrs. Ahluwalia

did everything that she could do in this geographic area in order
6

to obtain employment in her professional field and had not been
successful in obtaining any such employment at the time of trial.
(Tr. at R. 150-152, 157)

That evidence is uncontroverted.

The Trial Court gave no weight at all to Mrs. Ahluwalia's
professional training or work history in her profession. The Trial
Court completely ignored the desire of Mrs. Ahluwalia to continue
to reside in the geographic area where her children were and where
her children wanted to remain.

The Court in effect told Mrs.

Ahluwalia that if she could not find a teaching job in this
geographic area, she should move away from her children to obtain
work or she was not worthy of assistance from the man and family
she had left her job for in Florida early in this marriage.

The

Trial Court ignored the fact that Mrs. Ahluwalia had left her
professional field at the request of her husband to support him in
his for the vast majority of the marriage.
The Trial Court ignored

all standards of fairness,

decency and equity in imputing income to Mrs. Ahluwalia for times
when she was not working. The evidence was uncontroverted that the
job she had only paid for the days she worked, and was not a
salaried position, even though when the work was available she
worked 3 8 hours per week.

The Court created a new obligation for

alimony consideration that unless a person seeks to maximize their
ability to support themselves prior to the divorce trial, they
apparently do not deserve alimony.

See Findings of Fact nos. 19,

20, 21, 27 and 28.
The Trial Court's approach is totally contrary to Utah
7

law which holds that in the event that Mrs. Ahluwalia could not
obtain a job in the teaching field in which she was trained, an
award of rehabilitative alimony would be appropriate. See Bell v.
Bell, 810 P.2d 492 (Utah App. 1991).

This Court has clearly set

forth that where there is a discrepancy in the earnings between
professionals that discrepancy should be addressed and resolved
through an appropriate award of such rehabilitative alimony. See
Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah App. 1990), Thronson v. Thronson,
810 P.2d 248 (Utah App. 1991), Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647 (Utah
1988) and Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1992).
The

standard

of

living

accustomed,

the discrepancy

parties

equalize

to

the

to which

Mrs. Ahluwalia

in the earnings

standard

of

living

was

and

needs of

the

was

addressed

in

testimony at trial. (Tr. at R. 139, 158-162, 177-178, 228-249, 262263).

See also Trial Exhibits 2, 15 and 17.
As with the other critical evidence referenced above, the

Trial Court ignored the issue of the parties standard of living.
The Court made an incorrect finding that Mr. Ahluwalia could not
afford to pay alimony.

The Trial Court ignored the fact that Mr.

Ahluwalia went on a spending spree after the parties' separation,
incurring a loan for a vehicle that cost four times the amount of
any other vehicle ever previously purchased by the parties.

(Tr.

at R. 241). The Court called Mrs. Ahluwalia's expenses of $1500.00
per month "somewhat inflated".

See Finding of Fact no. 27.

Yet,

when Mr. Ahluwalia listed $400.00 per month for entertainment that
he never previously spent, the Court made no comment or finding
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regarding that issue. (Tr. at R. 245).
The evidence the Court ignored regarding Mr. Ahluwalia's
ability to pay, clearly establishes error by the Trial Court. When
that evidence is coupled with a fair analysis of the parties'
standard of living, Mrs. Ahluwalia's need, her work history and
training, alimony must be awarded in this 17 year marriage.

III.

CONCLUSION

The primary care-taker of the children, who cared for
their needs and improved their quality of life even by making the
painful decision to move out of the home, should have been awarded
custody in this matter.

Mrs. Ahluwalia clearly met all the

criteria necessary in order to be awarded custody of the minor
children, and consequently possession of the marital residence and
child support. Mr. Ahluwalia clearly failed to meet several of the
critical criteria for being awarded custody.

To fail to have

awarded custody to Mrs. Ahluwalia was clear error by the Trial
Court and should be reversed.
That the Trial Court gave absolutely no weight to Mrs.
Ahluwalia's training, prior work history, length of the marriage,
sacrifice for the family by leaving her tenured teaching position
in Florida to support her husband's career and that the Court made
no findings concerning any attempt to equalize the standard of
living of the parties was clear error by the Court on the alimony
decision.

Such decision must be reversed and Mrs. Ahluwalia must

be given an opportunity to rehabilitate herself.
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Mrs. Ahluwalia

respectfully requests that in the event the Court of Appeals agrees
and reverses the Trial Court, that it set the alimony award
in its decision, since Judge Frederick has clearly shown an
unwillingness to award any consideration for Mrs. Ahluwalia's
efforts to this family.
DATED this

y^tkday of

AJZl^^ly^

, 1994.

Respectfully submitted,

Richard N. Bigelow 7\
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
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